Pension fund sophistication and investment policy

This paper assesses the sophistication of pension funds' investment policies using data on 748 Dutch pension funds during the 1999.2006 period. We develop three indicators of sophistication: gross rounding of investment choices, investments in alternative sophisticated asset classes and 'home bias'. We find that pension funds' strategic portfolio choices are often based on coarse and possibly less sophisticated approaches. Most pension funds, particularly the medium-sized and smaller ones, round strategic asset allocations to the nearest multiple of 5%, similar to age heaping in demographic and historical studies. Second, many pension funds invest little or nothing in alternative asset classes besides equities and bonds, resulting in limited asset diversification. Third, medium-sized and smaller pension funds favor regional investments and as such not fully employ the opportunities of international diversification. Finally, we show that pension funds using less sophisticated asset allocation rules tend to opt for investment strategies with a lower risk-return profile.Pension funds, investment policy, portfolio choice, gross rounding, heaping, diversification, home bias, alternative investments, behavioral finance.

The development of instruments to measure the work disability assessment behaviour of insurance physicians

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Variation in assessments is a universal given, and work disability assessments by insurance physicians are no exception. Little is known about the considerations and views of insurance physicians that may partly explain such variation. On the basis of the Attitude - Social norm - self Efficacy (ASE) model, we have developed measurement instruments for assessment behaviour and its determinants.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Based on theory and interviews with insurance physicians the questionnaire included blocks of items concerning background variables, intentions, attitudes, social norms, self-efficacy, knowledge, barriers and behaviour of the insurance physicians in relation to work disability assessment issues. The responses of 231 insurance physicians were suitable for further analysis. Factor analysis and reliability analysis were used to form scale variables and homogeneity analysis was used to form dimension variables. Thus, we included 169 of the 177 original items.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Factor analysis and reliability analysis yielded 29 scales with sufficient reliability. Homogeneity analysis yielded 19 dimensions. Scales and dimensions fitted with the concepts of the ASE model. We slightly modified the ASE model by dividing behaviour into two blocks: behaviour that reflects the assessment process and behaviour that reflects assessment behaviour.</p> <p>The picture that emerged from the descriptive results was of a group of physicians who were motivated in their job and positive about the Dutch social security system in general. However, only half of them had a positive opinion about the Dutch Work and Income (Capacity for Work) Act (WIA). They also reported serious barriers, the most common of which was work pressure. Finally, 73% of the insurance physicians described the majority of their cases as 'difficult'.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>The scales and dimensions developed appear to be valid and offer a promising basis for future research. The results suggest that the underlying ASE model, in modified form, is suitable for describing the assessment behaviour of insurance physicians and the determinants of this behaviour. The next step in this line of research should be to validate the model using structural equation modelling. Finally, the predictive value should be tested in relation to outcome measurements of work disability assessments.</p

The role of leadership in salespeople’s price negotiation behavior

Salespeople assume a key role in defending firms’ price levels in price negotiations with customers. The degree to which salespeople defend prices should critically depend upon their leaders’ influence. However, the influence of leadership on salespeople’s price defense behavior is barely understood, conceptually or empirically. Therefore, building on social learning theory, the authors propose that salespeople might adopt their leaders’ price defense behavior given a transformational leadership style. Furthermore, drawing on the contingency leadership perspective, the authors argue that this adoption fundamentally depends on three variables deduced from the motivation–ability–opportunity (MAO) framework, that is, salespeople’s learning motivation, negotiation efficacy, and perceived customer lenience. Results of a multi-level model using data from 92 salespeople and 264 salesperson–customer interactions confirm these predictions. The first to explore contingencies of salespeople’s adoption of their transformational leaders’ price negotiation behaviors, this study extends marketing theory and provides actionable guidance to practitioners

The Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance on Market Discipline

This paper studies the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in a framework that resembles a natural experiment. We improve upon previous studies by exploiting a unique combination of country-specific circumstances, design features, and data availability that allows us to distinguish between demand and supply effects. We show that deposit insurance causes a significant reduction in market discipline. We also show that the effect of deposit insurance depends on the coverage rate. When the coverage rate is more than 60 percent, market discipline is significantly reduced and it is completely eliminated when the coverage rate reaches 100 percent. Our results also suggest that most market discipline comes from large depositors and that the introduction of deposit insurance affected mainly those who were already active in imposing discipline. Our findings emphasize the need for binding coverage limits per depositor, high degrees of co- insurance, and "tailor made" deposit insurance systems that preserve the incentives of a critical mass of depositors that are willing and able to perform this function.Market Discipline; Deposit Insurance; Deposit Insurance Coverage.

On the psychology and economics of antisocial personality

How do fundamental concepts from economics, such as individuals’ preferences and beliefs, relate to equally fundamental concepts from psychology, such as relatively stable personality traits? Can personality traits help us better understand economic behavior across strategic contexts? We identify an antisocial personality profile and examine the role of strategic context (the “situation”), personality traits (the “person”), and their interaction on beliefs and behaviors in trust games. Antisocial individuals exhibit a specific combination of beliefs and preferences that is difficult to reconcile with a rational choice approach that assumes that beliefs about others’ behaviors are formed rationally and therefore, independently from preferences. Variations in antisocial personality are associated with effect sizes that are as large as strong variations in strategic context. Antisocial individuals have lower trust in others unless they know that they can punish them. They are also substantially less trustworthy, believe that others are like themselves, and respond to the possibility of being sanctioned more strongly, suggesting that they anticipate severe punishment if they betray their partner’s trust. Antisocial individuals are not simply acting in their economic self-interest, because they harshly punish those who do not reciprocate their trust, although that reduces their economic payoff, and they do so nonimpulsively and in a very calculated manner. Antisocial individuals honor others’ trust significantly less (if they cannot be punished) but also, harshly punish those who betray their trust. Overall, it seems that antisocial individuals have beliefs and behaviors based on a view of the world that assumes that most others are as antisocial as they themselves are